The Russian Escalation in Ukraine, two years later

It has been two years since Russian president Vladimir Putin announced the beginning of the “special military operation” in Ukraine. While much ink has been spilled trying to analyze the events over the past two years, we can firmly state some truths.

Putin, Russian officials, and Russian forces have wrought destruction upon Ukraine. Originally, Putin hoped for a quick victory, anticipating Russia would take Kyiv within days and force the capitulation of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and his cabinet. While Russian claims of “denazification” and “desatanization” as justification for its actions are ridiculous, they draw on key features of Russian nationalism and of historical memory, particularly the Soviet victory over Nazism. Putin instrumentalizes this history in an attempt to unify the nation. Putin has also used the war to shore up his power at home, becoming more controlling, silencing protest and opposition. Although flickers of discontent have appeared – including from those protesting Alexei Navalny’s death, silent protest in support for Ukraine, and the ill-fated Yevgeny Prigozhin “coup” attempt (in reality a protest against the Russian military leadership and their failures in Ukraine) – Many Russians appear to have a general ambivalence, if not tacit support, for the war, based on Russian polling data.

Putin, Russian officials, and Russian state media are shameless in their rhetoric towards Ukrainians, openly spitting genocidal epithets, denying Ukrainian identity, and mocking the West for its support for Ukraine. Russian forces couple this with violence to Ukrainians and the Ukrainian nation. Countless accounts exist of Russian forces committing war crimes or atrocities against Ukrainians, and an increasing number of reports document the Russification in Russian-occupied Ukrainian territory.

Ukraine, on the other hand, has shown remarkable resilience. It resisted the initial Russian advance in February and March 2022 and made notable gains in liberating some of its territory. Zelenskyy has established himself as an effective war-time president, showing incredible bravery by visiting Ukrainian soldiers on the front line. Ukrainians show their bravery by living in a warzone, where Russian terror bombing makes death possible at any point, yet they hope to regain some normalcy.

Ukrainians also understand what this war is about. As talks of peace negotiations echo in opinion pieces in Western media, spurred by vague statements from Russian leaders, the reality is that Russia has shown no willingness to consider any peace settlement that does not recognize Russian control over vast amounts of Ukraine. Russian occupation means grave violence to Ukrainians; for this reason, Ukrainians continue to fight. They have no other choice. Territorial swaps to “save Ukraine” ring hollow. They merely freeze the conflict, allow Russia to rearm while devastating Ukrainians in occupied territories, and remove the one benefit Ukraine has – attention from the West.

But that attention is dwindling. Two years after the escalation began – ten years after Putin invaded Crimea – the consensus that developed around supporting Ukraine is showing cracks. Although many nations, including Canada, have provided significant economic, humanitarian, and military aid over the last two years, it has not always come as quickly as necessary. Particularly today, as Ukrainian forces withdraw from Avdiivka, the slow-drip provision of military aid is having notable effects. Meanwhile, Russia has geared its economy for war. Putin has reportedly told the Chinese leader Xi Jinping that Russia can fight for five years. With this dwindling consensus and rumours of another round of Russian mobilization, it is very possible Putin may elect to wait until Western support for Ukraine ends. He may realize he can take what he wishes later.

The reality is that the West’s hesitancy to provide all the resources that Ukraine needs to defeat Russia is the main reason this war continues. 2022 showed Ukrainian success, ingenuity, and ability to use Western weaponry. Imagine what 2023 could have looked like if Western nations had been more proactive and aggressive in providing the necessary military resources for Ukraine.

Instead, some pine for the world of pre-February 2022. That world is gone and never will return. Instead, Russian leaders have been clear in wanting to wipe out Ukraine, and to stand up to the West in doing so. 2024 will be hard to predict, but Ukraine needs the support from its allies, and Russia must be defeated, or the lessons its leaders learn will only embolden them.

Peace and the Russo-Ukrainian War

So you want to talk about peace in Ukraine. Here’s a quick primer regarding the issues at play if you want your ideas to be taken seriously.

First, full disclosure, I have been clear about my position on peace. I think it is unlikely in the near future. I write so here and explain why: Calls for peace in Ukraine a year after Russia’s full scale invasion are unrealistic.

Any discussion of peace needs to consider that it will be, in some way, in the control of the governments of Ukraine and Russia. The West has made it their position that Ukraine will decide its terms. Russia has made clear it is an unreliable partner. Both have maintained maximalist terms.

But let’s say that changes somehow – then what? First, any discussion of territory has to realize Russian occupation has been harsh and brutal. This recent AP report has more (explaining things we’ve known about since Feb 2022): AP News on treatment of Ukrainians under Russian occupation

If Russia maintains control of Ukrainian territory, Ukrainians will continue to targeted and subjected to this horrible treatment. Russian occupation = Ukrainian oppression and further violence and death. This is why liberation, after defense, has been the key aim for Ukraine.

Some plans focus on a ceasefire. Except we know Russia likes to use ceasefires to reload and prepare for renewed violence. This is what happened with Minsk. If you call for a ceasefire, explain how we can trust Russia. Many experts, and Ukrainians, don’t for good reason.

Some focus on agreements to keep Ukraine out of NATO or the EU. Given recent announcements by NATO, NATO membership is not likely until after the war ends (and even then, I don’t think it’s going to happen. Same for EU.). That aside, if your plan sees Ukraine accepting neutrality, how is the plan better than it was before when de facto that neutrality existed (Ukraine was not part of NATO/EU; Sweden and Finland joined NATO with some minor tantrums from Russian officials)? Oh but security guarantees. Well, any NATO member likely isn’t an option, as Russia won’t agree. China’s peace plan was rejected out of hand by Russia and China may not want to put itself in that position. The positions of Lula, for example, make BRICs unlikely to be accepted by Ukraine.

Finally, people offering peace plans focusing on ceasefires, territory swaps, etc, often don’t realize that’s a recipe for future war. What does LASTING PEACE look like? For Ukrainians, it focuses on liberation, justice for Russian atrocities, and reparations. For Russia, lasting peace is the carve up of Ukraine, and its firm placement under its control. This is a war about Russian imperialism. Their destruction of Ukraine is plain to see. How is this squared away to bring lasting peace?

I get wanting the war to end. Ukrainians would love the war to end. They understand the stakes more than any. But many Ukrainians understand what Russia is doing to their nation and their people. Hence liberation and defense as key aims.

And no serious person is suggesting diplomacy should just be thrown out. It has led to the grain deal, to prisoner swaps and other minor agreements that show some hope. The issue is that in big picture things (fate of Ukraine), diplomacy stops quickly. And incremental diplomacy can be important, but there is a difference between keeping options open and expecting magically things will work out. Magically that a ceasefire will work. Magically, that Russia will stop.

Many of these recent peace plans I’ve seen floating around from certain candidates really focus on ending the war right now, and often, ending the world’s focus on it. They claim to care about people, but as I suggest above, that’s not what they’re actually worried about. It’s frankly so they can sleep better at night and go back to ignoring Ukraine as the world did in 2014 or because they struggle with the ramifications of their ideological outlook. Some fear the war expanding or fear nuclear weapons being used (And I find these concerns understandable!). But Russia can’t face the world (and clearly didn’t think the world would get involved, hence its need to fearmonger). Still, this has remained a war largely localized to Ukraine.

My point – Diplomacy is hard. Peace is hard. And yes, at some point, Ukrainian and Russian leaders may be in a position to negotiate. And hard decisions may need to be made. That does not appear to be at this point. And an imposed peace on Ukraine solves little. So if you’re going to offer a peace plan, and you want it to be taken seriously, consider the above. And realize it’s very complicated. But also realize, what you don’t consider about the reality on the ground speaks volumes.

To be blunt, many peace plans ignore what Russian forces are doing in Ukraine to Ukrainians. And that immediately suggests their peace plan ignores the realities of this war and is based on naivety, ignorance, or worse.  

The History 2705 International Relations Thinker Database

This year, I taught a class entitled “The Western Tradition of International Relations, Theory and Practice” at Western University. In both terms, students write an encyclopedia-style overview of the major thinkers and works covered in the course. The assignments serve to practice effective and efficient writing, while also acting as exam review for each term. Additionally, the assignment had a built-in resubmission process to simulate the peer review process, given that many of the students hope to continue work in academia, research or policy analysis. For interested students, I offered the option for these overviews to be published in a blog.

The blog is now live and will serve to act as a database of international relations thinkers. As students volunteer their work and complete final edits, they will be uploaded, providing students with a publication to help strength their CV/resume. These entries also will serve to help them as they continue in their studies in Western University’s International Relations program. I also hope that the database, over time, will become a useful resource for scholars of international relations broadly and it will contain, in some cases, multiple entries on the same topics with content and analysis reflecting the different points of view and interests of the students themselves.

If you’re interested, you can find the link here: http://history2705.wordpress.com or click the link at the top of the page.

Within and Against the Metropole: Communism and Transnational Anti-Colonialism in Interwar Europe

The following is information about an event I am pleased to be a part of later this year and is open to the public. More information can be found at https://cominternanticolonialism.wordpress.com :

Within and Against the Metropole: Communism and Transnational Anti-Colonialism in Interwar Europe

(University of Manchester// November 30th , 2018// 9:30 am- 4:30 pm)

The professed internationalism and anti-imperialism of the Communist movement has attracted the attention of historians of transnational labour movements, Empire and colonialism. A resurgence in studies which focus on the relationship between Communists and anti-colonial movements has taken place, due to both the growing availability of formerly-restricted source materials, and the rise of increasingly-sophisticated transnational methodologies. These new sources and methods have allowed for a richer study of the development, growth, transformation, and decline of anti-colonial networks involving Communist activists, with emphasis placed on the role of border-crossing populations and individuals, local cultures of activism, and patterns of conflict and cooperation in both the Comintern and national Communist Parties’ apparatuses.
This one-day conference will bring together an international group of scholars to explore the relationship between Communism and anti-colonialism in the interwar period. This will include sessions on the transnational connections and journeys of individual activists and their relationship to the structures of International Communism; various anti-colonial milieus’ connections to labour and social movements in differing national and regional contexts; and the broader relationships between Communists, race, and nationalism, both in colonial and metropolitan settings.
Confirmed speakers include:
– Satnam Virdee (University of Glasgow)
– Kasper Braskén (Åbo Akademi)
– Oleksa Drachewych (Independent Scholar)
– Daniel Edmonds (Independent Scholar)
– David Featherstone (University of Glasgow)
– Kate O’Malley (Royal Irish Academy)
– Professors Kevin Morgan, John Callaghan, and Neville Kirk, in a roundtable discussion.

Thanks to the generosity of the Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence, attendance will be free, and registered attendees will receive lunch as well as tea and coffee. To book your place please email anticolonialconference@gmail.com